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1 0 DEC 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief, Product Review Group,

Intelligence Community Staff

25X1

ATTENTION

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THROUGH

Acting Deputy Director for

Management and Services

SUBJECT

Unauthorized Disclosures

- 1. Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Members of the United States Intelligence Board prepared by the Office of Security in response to the Director's request on 5 December 1973.
- 2. The memorandum contains some of the Director's recent remarks which seem particularly appropriate. The thrust of the content is toward the individual's personal commitment for protection of intelligence. It is unclassified and may be given wide dissemination.
- 3. If the memorandum meets with your approval, it is requested that you forward it to General Graham and the Director.

25X1

Howard J. sborn
Director of Security

Attachment

SEGRET

E. 3 IMPDET CL BY 006063

SECRET

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures

Distribution:

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Orig - Addressee

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SEGRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Principals

SUBJECT : Unauthorized Disclosures

- 1. As Director of Central Intelligence I am committed to conduct our foreign intelligence activities in conformity with the laws, the standards and the customs of the United States. This includes an orderly review, declassification and appropriate release of intelligence materials. As Director I am also charged with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and I am concerned about the recent spate of articles in the press which jeopardize them.
- 2. Some stories may have resulted from a simple compilation of bits and pieces of intelligence inadvertently disclosed. But some have revealed depth and detail which could only come from those with authorized access to classified intelligence. Such deliberate leaks about our foreign intelligence sources and methods for personal or institutional gain are invariably short-sighted. In the long view they can and do:
 - (a) Threaten the safety and welfare of dedicated and loyal officers.
 - (b) Reduce or curtail our sources.
 - (c) Provide foreign services with gratuitous insight into our capabilities and limitations.
 - (d) Reduce or eliminate the confidential nature of intelligence with a corresponding reduction of its value to the government.
 - (e) Waste our tax dollars.

- 3. A number of actions have been taken to close this gap in the security of the intelligence community. Personal representation by previous Directors backed by strong expressions of Presidential concern have been made. You have established security guides which, if scrupulously followed, would reduce the number of inadvertent disclosures and limit the damage of deliberate leaks. The actions have had some success. But in the final analysis I believe the solution to the leak problem rests with the individual at all levels who has authorized access to classified materials.
- 4. The responsibility for protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods requires a personal commitment. It requires the individual to take upon himself the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the privileged information with which he is entrusted. It requires that the individual accept the general and fundamental concept that one individual cannot assume responsibility for deciding that he alone knows best what should and what should not be revealed. It requires use of established procedures by each individual when release of intelligence seems indicated for whatever reason.
- 5. I ask the Members of the Board to make my views on this matter known to all individuals with access to our intelligence materials. I request that you make available to them your guidelines and procedures to be followed on the release of intelligence and encourage full participation in them.
- 6. I believe that if we have the individual's personal commitment to protect intelligence and to comply with established guidelines for its release we need not fear for our intelligence sources and methods.

W. E. Colby Director